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In principle, the installation of emissions abatement technology (otherwise known as scrubbers)
on ships would reduce air pollution and premature deaths from disease and allow vessels to save
costs by continuing to burn cheap high-sulphur residual fuel oil. But very few scrubbers have been
installed. A recent House of Commons Select Committee Inquiry was unable to decide between
the competing technical claims of scrubber manufacturers and ship operators, over whether
scrubber technology was sufficiently ‘mature’ for present installation. From the perspective of
science and technology studies, this paper draws on interviews with stakeholders and written
and oral evidence to the committee to argue that this was a dispute, which foregrounded tech-
nical arguments for investment decisions that were actually being taken on economic grounds.
Where scientific/technical closure is a matter of communal understanding rather than technical
demonstration, technical doubt can be used instrumentally for economic reasons to delay closure.
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1. Introduction
The starting point for this paper is a report from the
Transport Select Committee of the UK’s House of
Commons on ‘Sulphur emissions by ships’ (House of
Commons Transport Committee 2012). The committee’s
Inquiry had been occasioned by shipping industry
concerns that that new international regulations restricting
the sulphur levels in marine fuels, and additional proposed
restrictions by the European Commission on the sulphur
levels of fuels used in passenger ships, were damaging the
competitiveness of the shipping industry and threatening
to cause a modal shift from low-carbon maritime transport
to high-carbon road transport. The relevant regulations
exempted vessels from burning much more expensive
low-sulphur fuels where those vessels had ﬁtted abatement
technology (known as scrubbers) to remove sulphur oxides
(SOx), nitrogenous oxides (NOx) and harmful particulate
matter (PM) from the vessels’ exhaust gases. The commit-
tee considered that scrubber technologies had the potential
to deliver population health beneﬁts through decreased air
pollution while continuing to allow ship operators to burn
low-cost, high-sulphur, fuel oil and was concerned that
so little progress had been made in the installation of
scrubbers. It identiﬁed a clear disagreement between ship
operators and scrubber manufacturers about whether or
not scrubber technology had reached sufﬁcient ‘maturity’
for such installations to proceed, but the committee
pronounced itself unable to judge between the competing
scientiﬁc claims of the two industries in their written and
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oral evidence. The UK Department for Transport, in its
response to the committee’s report (House of Commons
Transport Committee 2012), similarly avoided pronoun-
cing on those contested claims.
We will examine whether the debate over the ﬁtting of
scrubbers has an instrumental character, insofar as public
debates about the ﬁtness-for-purpose of existing scrubber
technology have served to delay expensive investment de-
cisions in the face of economic and regulatory uncertainty.
The process we are seeking to describe here is analogous to
Habermas’s description of the ‘scientization of politics’ —
the conversion of political disputes into technical disputes.
Politicians refer to expert advice and potentially conten-
tious decisions are then
. . . denuded of their ideologically transﬁgured and compelling
character. (Habermas 1970: 68)
Both the scrubber manufacturers and the ship owners/op-
erators (and their respective industry associations) have
sought to justify contentious economic decisions by
recourse to technical data on the effectiveness and robust-
ness of scrubber systems.
Near-parallels can be drawn between the scrubbers
dispute and ﬁndings from various previous science and
technology studies (STS) projects. The study by Pinch
et al. (1984) of the development of the safety cycle (and
the partial reworking of their original argument by Bijker
(1995)) laid the groundwork for a number of studies which
contested the implicit technological determinism of earlier
studies of technological innovation. They argued that there
is an important degree of ‘interpretive ﬂexibility’ in the
understanding of technology and that the adoption of a
technology depends in some large part (but not entirely)
upon the strength and size of the social group or collect-
ivity that takes it up and promotes it. Interpretive ﬂexibil-
ity means, in effect, that one person’s efﬁcient technical
device is another person’s questionable object. For
example, Edwards’ study of the growth of computing
technology
. . . cast[s] technological change as technological choice, tying it
to political choices and socially constituted values at every
level. (Edwards 1996: xiii)
Likewise, the work of Gusterson (2008) on the expert
debates about whether to replace possibly unreliable
stored nuclear weapons with the assumed-to-be reliable
(but untested) Reliable Replacement Warhead. In these
nuclear weapons disputes, technical and political judge-
ments are indissoluble and evidence is constructed in dif-
ferent ways by opposing experts:
To its advocates, [the Reliable Replacement Warhead] is more
reliable than existing warheads. To its opponents, it is less
reliable. (Gusterson 2008: 558)
Relatedly, actor-network theory, associated with the work
of Latour (1988) and of Callon (1986), sees innovation as
the construction of an expanding network of actors, both
advocates and opponents, with material interests that have
to be accommodated. Within STS there are differences of
viewpoint between different proponents (see Callon and
Latour (1992) versus Collins and Yearley (1992)), but
this is not our main concern here. Instead, this paper
seeks to identify some of the most salient economic and
regulatory uncertainties that may underlie interpretive
ﬂexibility over the ﬁtness for maritime installation of
scrubber technology, and to show how technical doubts
raised through this interpretive ﬂexibility may serve instru-
mentally the economic and political interests of partici-
pants in this technological controversy. Ship operators
wish avoid any perception among charterers or the
public that they are environmentally irresponsible, and
so are likely to emphasise sincerely held technical doubts
rather than economic difﬁculties as the reasons for
delaying investment in technology with environmental
beneﬁts.
The shipping industry carries more than 80% of world
trade by volume and cheap maritime freight rates have
been one of the motors of globalisation, with the cost of
shipping Chinese jeans to the UK working out at around
£0.20 per pair. The industry itself is one of those most
altered by globalising economic processes, now
characterised by complex ‘global value chains’ (Gerefﬁ
et al. 2005) of different contractors. Typically, a vessel
may be owned by a transnational corporation, managed
by a specialist international ship management company,
and crewed by the casualised employees of a specialist
crewing agency. Ship owners and ship operators do not
own the cargo, that is the property of the charterer. The
industry displays a ‘polycentric governance structure’
(Bloor et al. 2013) that is complex, multi-level, over-
lapping, part interdependent and part fragmented.
Governance roles are played by non-State actors (for
example, the Oil Companies International Marine
Forum, which inspects and vets vessels for the tanker
trade), local actors (for example, port health authorities),
global UN agencies (the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) which sets ship standards, and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) which sets ship
labour standards), regional actors (for example, the
European Commission, and regional associations of
port-States which collaborate to enforce IMO and ILO
standards on berthing ships of all nations), and national
actors—the national maritime administrations which are
represented at IMO and ILO, give effect to IMO/ILO
standards in their national laws, enforce those laws on
their own ﬂagged ships (‘ﬂag-State control’) and in their
own ports (‘port-State control’), and enact and enforce
their own unique maritime regulations, for example, the
Swedish ‘fairway dues’ which are levied on berthing ships
to pay the costs of ice-breaking and navigation lights and
are differentiated to reward ‘greener’ vessels.
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Air pollution from ship emissions is a serious concern.
Until recent IMO regulations came into force, most ocean-
going ships burned a marine fuel which was, and still is, a
cheap residual by-product of oil reﬁneries—that which is
not sold for marine fuel is used for road tar. The burning
of this residual fuel releases large quantities of NOx and
SOx gases (which harm crops, forests and oceans through
acidiﬁcation) and ﬁne particulate matter (PM25) which
causes lung and coronary illness. A scientiﬁc review for
IMO estimated that ship emissions were causing 64,000
premature deaths per year worldwide (27,000 deaths in
Europe) in 2002 (Corbett et al. 2007), and ships are
estimated to emit 150–300 times more SO2 per ton km
than lorries burning diesel with just 50 ppm sulphur
(Hemmings 2010). The IMO regulations on sulphur
content in fuel came into force in 2005 and were revised
in 2010. The worldwide sulphur cap was initially set at
4.5%, reducing to 3.5% in 2012, with a projected further
reduction to 0.5% in 2020. This last 2020 deadline is
subject to a planned review and could be postponed until
2025. Additionally, IMO set up Emission Control Areas
(ECAs) in the Baltic (from 2006), the North Sea/English
Channel (from 2007) and North America (from 2012).
Initially, the sulphur limit for the ECAs was set at 1.5%,
reducing to 1.0% in 2010, and due to reduce further to
0.1% in 2015. The projected restriction to 0.1% sulphur
in the ECAs in 2015 would, in effect, require all vessels in
the ECAs (except those ﬁtted with scrubbers) to switch
from low-cost residual heavy fuel oil to high-cost distillate
fuels. Additionally, the EU has introduced restrictions on
sulphur levels for passenger ships in EU waters and restric-
tions on the sulphur levels of fuel that can be burned in EU
ports and harbours. California also has restrictions on fuel
sulphur levels in ports and coastal waters. It has been
calculated that the projected IMO global 0.5% sulphur
limit would reduce annual premature deaths by 41,200
(Winebrake et al. 2009).
The shipping industry is notoriously subject to cyclical
ﬂuctuations in proﬁtability and investment (Lane 1986).
When freight rates are high the order books at shipyards
rapidly ﬁll up. However, by the time new vessels are
launched, they often enter the market place in very
changed economic circumstances. Typically in such cir-
cumstances, the increased carrying capacity represented
by the new builds serves to further deﬂate falling freight
rates and this reduces both the inclination and ﬁnancial
capacity of the industry to invest in new vessels in hard
economic times. As a consequence, when world trade
improves there is undercapacity in the industry, resulting
in rising freight rates and overinvestment in new building,
which renews the cycle once again. At present the industry
is at the low point of the cycle: in early 2012 the Baltic Dry
Index, which measures short-term freight rates for the bulk
carrier sector, dropped to the lowest point in its 26-year
history, with the international bulk carrier ﬂeet due to
expand by 14% in 2012, compared to an expected 3%
gain in the volume of seaborne trade (Norris 2012).
Other industry sectors, such as the container and tanker
trades, have been hit almost as hard. The shipping industry
simply does not invest on any scale during economic reces-
sions: the Council Working Party on Shipbuilding of the
OECD announced in July 2009 that worldwide new orders
had contracted by up to 90% in the last quarter of 2008
and the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, compared to the third quarter
of 2007 (OECD 2009). International regulations on ship
emissions which ostensibly might incentivise ship oper-
ators to invest in the installation of scrubbers are coming
into force at a time of greatly reduced industry investment.
Following a description of the study methods, this paper
ﬁrst examines the conﬂicting scientiﬁc evidence claims
made to the House of Commons Transport Select
Committee. Secondly, the paper reports on further con-
tested claims on scrubbers made at interview by a range
of industry stakeholders; and thirdly, on alternative
accounts—non-technical reasons advanced by interviewees
for the lack of investment in scrubbers. These non-tech-
nical reasons for non-investment were: the lack of advan-
tage for ‘ﬁrst movers’, regulatory uncertainty, uncertainty
about the type of scrubber that should be installed, lack of
investment funds, managerial short-termism, and uncer-
tainty about the future availability of high-sulphur fuel
oil for scrubbers. The paper concludes by relating these
empirical data to STS analyses of counterfeit scientiﬁc/
technical disputes.
2. Methods
The data reported here were collected as part of an
Economic & Social Research Council-funded study
which compared the UK and Sweden on issues in the en-
forcement of the new international regulations on ships’
sulphur emissions. Although enforcement practices in
respect of the operation of scrubbers might have formed
an important part of the study, in the event this proved not
to be the case. The monitoring of scrubber operations
(by ﬂag-State inspections or by port-State inspections)
will not be an important issue in the short-term because
very few vessels are being ﬁtted with scrubbers. A very few
new builds are currently being ﬁtted with scrubbers on a
trial basis (see below), additional to a small number of trial
installations already in operation, but retroﬁtting of scrub-
bers onto current vessels is hardly occurring. Enquiries
with dry-dock managers in early 2012 did not turn up
any current retroﬁts of scrubbers taking place1 and we
know of only one such retroﬁt currently being planned
before 2015: a vessel belonging to Maersk (the largest
shipping company in the world), and in this case the
scrubber will only be retroﬁtted to a single auxiliary
engine, not a main engine. So scrubber installations,
although only forming a limited fraction of our dataset,
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excited our curiosity as the ‘dog that didn’t bark in the
night’.
The dataset for the study comprised the observation
of 16 ship inspections (involving visits to seven different
port-State control ofﬁces in the UK and Sweden) and 50
qualitative interviews with a range of different industry
stakeholders, again in both the UK and Sweden. None
of the ship observations involved vessels with scrubbers.
The range of interviewees embraced port-State inspectors,
national and international regulators, managers within
shipping companies, industry associations, classiﬁcation
societies, bunkerers, marine fuel experts, trade unionists
and environmental non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). All the interviews involved questions on scrub-
bers, although not all interviewees felt sufﬁciently qualiﬁed
or experienced to offer opinions. Four interviews were not
taped at the request of the interviewees. Transcripts were
made of the remainder and those transcripts, ﬁeld notes
and interview notes were all coded and systematically
analysed using analytic induction (Bloor 1978). The
written and oral evidence to the House of Commons
Transport Select Committee, the committee’s report, and
the government’s response are all available from the
Parliament website (House of Commons Transport
Committee 2012).
3. The Transport Committee Inquiry
The committee, as is usual with House of Commons Select
Committees, advertised a request for written evidence and
also requested a number of individuals to give oral
evidence and to submit to questions from the members.
A report was issued and published along with the
response of the government. The committee’s report con-
tained a number of statements on abatement (i.e. scrub-
bers) technology which were careful to avoid a judgement
on the present robustness of the technology, such as:
It is not yet clear whether this technology will be available in
the near future. (House of Commons Transport Committee
2012: 2)
and
We are not in a position to judge the maturity of abate-
ment technology. (House of Commons Transport Committee
2012: 3)
An interviewee sought to explain the committee’s position:
. . . it’s not that unusual to get a situation where one side says
one thing and the other side say another. But both of them
backed it up with credible-looking evidence [. . .]. That’s why it
was impossible, you know, we put the evidence to both sides
and they both gave credible points-of-view back [. . .]. That’s
quite unusual – normally somebody collapses because they
can’t back up their view at all [. . .]. I have to say it was a
mystery why the two sides were so far apart. (interview: par-
liamentary advisor)
Both the written and the oral evidence to the committee on
scrubbers were peppered with assertions of fact that were
sharply conﬂicting. On the one hand we have these state-
ments from ship operators:
. . . it is not feasible to retro-ﬁt these [scrubbers] to most
existing vessels because the equipment is bulky and heavy
and would therefore sacriﬁce capacity. They also create stabil-
ity issues, are expensive and, even though high efﬁciency can
be demonstrated on some pilot installations, MARPOL [i.e.
the IMO international air pollution regulations] requires 100%
compliance. There is no room for temporary disruptions.
Scrubbers can, of course, be incorporated in any new ship
design provided the technology becomes more reli-
able . . . (written evidence: Brittany Ferries)
. . .while scrubbers have been demonstrated to work well in
shore installations such as power stations, manufacturers
have yet to able to ‘marinise’ their equipments sufﬁciently
[. . .] much more time is require to make it functional,
reliable and able to meet the compliance requirements.
(written evidence: Maritime UK, an umbrella group represent-
ing UK ports and ship operators)
The technology is not there. I do not think anybody who ﬁts a
scrubber will have absolute conﬁdence that that scrubber will
work in a compliance regime. That is what you need because, if
you cannot guarantee the scrubber will work in a compliance
regime, you have to have all the additional back up plans, such
as additional piping and tankage, to cope when the scrubber is
not in operation. (oral evidence: Robert Ashdown, European
Cruise Council)
And, on the other hand, there were conﬂicting statements
from the Exhaust Gases Cleaning Suppliers Association
(EGCSA), the European Commission, and an environ-
mental NGO:
EGCSA members currently have exhaust gas cleaning systems
installed and operational on eight vessels and have orders for
installations on a further ten vessels. [. . .] The position senior
leadership in the Marine Industry has taken so far, is to avoid
or delay any strategic planning and or attempt to delay entry
into force [of the impending regulations] with various claims of
modal shift, increased cost of fuel, lack of impact assessment
etc. [. . .] EGCSA members have been attempting to introduce
their technology on board ship for over three years, they have
been frustrated by the unwillingness of ship-owners to take up
the technology. Comments by Maritime UK such as
‘unproven’ [. . .] are simply incorrect and misleading. They per-
petuate a myth which has no foundation and which provides
ship-owners with a reason not to take action . . . (written
evidence: EGCSA)
When the 2005 [Commission] Directive was introduced [. . .]
the Directive was foreseeing trials of scrubbers. [. . .] The
Commission had to be notiﬁed [. . .] of the results. Such trials
have been carried out on several ships, with the result that the
conclusions drawn by the operator of the ship were fundamen-
tally different from the conclusions drawn by the supplier who
installed the scrubber. [. . .] the Commission is of the view that
scrubbers are ready for purpose but most likely they will still
undergo further development, just as the cellular phone was
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very different 20 years ago from what we have now. (oral
evidence: Christian Wimmer, Policy Ofﬁcer, European
Commission)
Flue gas cleaning of sulphur (scrubbing) is a technology that
has proven to be very effective with industrial plants. Tests on
ships have demonstrated at least 90% SO2 removal efﬁ-
ciency . . . (written evidence: the Air Pollution & Climate
Secretariat, an environmental NGO)
Two of those called to give oral evidence were Mr Gregory
of EGCSA (and previously of the scrubber manufacturer
BP Krystallon) and Mr Garner of P&O Ferries, who had
both been closely involved in the trial of a BP Krystallon
scrubber retroﬁtted onto one of the generators (rather than
a main engine) on the P&O ferry, the Pride of Kent, in
2005. They drew very different conclusions from the
same trial evidence, just as Mr Wimmer of the European
Commission described. Parallels with the adversarial court
evidence of expert witnesses, as analysed by Jasanoff
(1995), are very clear. P&O Ferries chose not to invest in
scrubbers on their two new ferries, the Spirit of Britain and
the Spirit of France, which came into service in 2011 and
2012, respectively.
As further evidence of this mismatch of perspectives, we
can cite the fact that scrubber manufacturers can point to
the certiﬁcation (by the respected classiﬁcation societies
Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd) of a
Wartsila–Metso-manufactured scrubber as meeting IMO
standards for scrubbers and to the sale by Wartsila of
scrubbers for a ﬂeet of six vessels to the Canadian
shipping company Algoma Central (Wartsila 2012).
Whereas, on the other hand, a shipping industry associ-
ation representative could baldly state at interview:
. . . the scrubbers as they exist today are not a possibility,
neither technically nor economically.
Public debate over the effectiveness of scrubber technology
is, of course, still continuing (see, for example, the report
commissioned by the UK Chamber of Shipping (2013)).
However, all the main reasons for non-investment, both
technical and non-technical can be traced within the
Inquiry evidence and (more clearly) within the study inter-
view transcripts. We list these non-technical reasons sep-
arately in the next section.
4. Non-technological reasons for
non-investment
4.1 No incentives for early investors/no first-mover
advantage
Scrubber-less ships trading within the ECAs will not be
obliged to switch from residual fuel to much more expen-
sive distillate until 2015. Early, pre-2015 investors would
be seriously disadvantaged initially compared to their non-
investing competitors because of the cost of the
installation, the loss of vessel earnings in dry dock, and
the extra running costs of the installation. Similarly, in
respect of vessels trading outside the ECAs, owners who
chose to invest in scrubbers prior to the current 2020
deadline for switching to 0.5% sulphur fuel could ﬁnd
themselves seriously disadvantaged against their non-in-
vesting competitors if, after review, IMO decided to
postpone that deadline until 2025. As one interviewee
put it:
. . . if you can run on heavy fuel oil for ﬁve years more while
your competitor has bought a scrubber, you will have a huge
advantage compared to your competitor. (shipping company
manager)
The only compensating advantage for early investors
appears to lie in being ﬁrst in what could be a lengthy
queue for dry-dock facilities. More than one interviewee
pointed to the need for a global governance structure for
the industry which rewarded early investors, such as the
Norwegian NOx Fund which taxes vessels and then com-
pensates investors in ship propulsion systems which reduce
NOx emissions.
4.2 Regulatory uncertainty
In respect of ship sulphur emissions, regulatory
uncertainty takes several forms. First, there is uncertainty
over the deadline for a global (non-ECA) sulphur cap of
0.5%—as mentioned above, IMO left open the option
of postponing that deadline until 2025, depending on a
review (taking into account projected future global fuel
availability) to be completed by 2018. Secondly, there is
the possibility that energetic lobbying by shipping inter-
ests (at IMO and at national government level) could
ensure a postponement or a modiﬁcation of the regula-
tions, as they relate to both the global and the ECA
sulphur caps:
As an industry we have not been passive; we have been meeting
with every shipping Minister since 2008 on this issue. We have
been lobbying heavily and raising the concerns that we raise
today. (oral evidence: Lars Ollsson, Stena Line and Vice
Chairman of Maritime UK)
The very creation of the Transport Select Committee
Inquiry was itself, in part, a result of such political
activity by the industry. Opponents, of course, allege
that such political lobbying itself generates an atmosphere
of regulatory uncertainty which inhibits investment
decisions:
There were discussions and discussions and discussions for 20
years until you arrived at this solution [IMO regulations].
Then, after the decision was taken, it was questioned for
several years instead of just getting on with it. It is uncertainty
about the deadline of 2015. Who is causing that uncertainty? It
is not the people who work with legislation or environmental
protection. It is the industry itself. (oral evidence: Christer
Agren, environmental NGO)
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And it is also alleged that lobbyists purposely overstate
the technical and economic difﬁculties of meeting new en-
vironmental regulations:
When it comes to producing environmental standards, what
you observe, for example, for cars is that it was always claimed
until the last day before a provision came into force that the
technology was not available, and all of a sudden, overnight, it
was available and it was typically, in the case of cars, cheaper
than predicted by a factor of 10. (oral evidence: (Christian
Wimmer, policy ofﬁcer, European Commission)
A third and important source of regulatory uncertainty lies
in the possibility of regulatory diversity between jurisdic-
tions, in the possibility of future additional regional,
national or local regulations on sulphur emissions being
framed which are at variance with the IMO regulations
and which may not allow the use of scrubbers, or the use
of certain types of scrubbers. This relates back to the afore-
mentioned polycentric governance structure of the
industry. There is a danger that vessels ﬁtted with scrub-
bers to IMO standards may nevertheless ﬁnd themselves
non-compliant with local regulations in certain ports, with
the consequent possibility of a ﬁne for contravention of
local pollution laws and/or detention of the vessel. Thus,
the European Commission has proposed a revised directive
on ships’ sulphur emissions, which would set down re-
quirements for scrubber systems additional to IMO stand-
ards. So-called ‘wet scrubbers’, which involve the discharge
of wash-water overboard, must meet IMO requirements
on those discharges, but EGCSA claim that the proposed
Commission directive would additionally require:
. . . each and every ship to be able to demonstrate that their
discharge is not causing an impact to the marine and aquatic
environment. (oral evidence: Donald Gregory, EGCSA)
There are also fears that in future Baltic States may ban
wash-water discharges from wet scrubbers because of
concerns that these discharges may contribute to the acid-
iﬁcation of the Baltic. The pH level of discharge water
from the DFDS ferry Tor Ficaria, ﬁtted with what is
claimed to be the world’s largest vessel scrubber, is in the
range 3–5 (freshwater pH=7), depending on exhaust gas
and water ﬂow (Knudsen, 2010). It should be noted that
the Tor Ficaria wash-water discharges do not meet the
IMO guidelines (pH=6.5) and Denmark has accordingly
proposed a revision in those guidelines. So some regulatory
uncertainty exists even in respect of the IMO regime.
Additionally, there are fears that certain ports may ban
wash-water discharges and may not recognise derogation
from the IMO low-sulphur regulations for vessels with
scrubbers. The Tor Ficaria is actually ﬁtted with a hybrid
(seawater/freshwater) scrubber with the capacity to store
discharge in sensitive areas like ports and estuaries, but
future regulations may not differentiate between types of
scrubbers when it comes to derogations.
Ship operators (at least those operating in European and
North American waters) have adopted a ‘culture of com-
pliance’, associated with an assumption that non-compli-
ance will be detected and sanctioned (Bloor et al. 2013).
This culture of compliance persists despite the regulatory
uncertainty that comes from a fragmented, polycentric
governance structure. This regulatory uncertainty poses
three different types of risk for potential scrubber in-
vestors: ﬁrst, the risk of ﬁnes/detentions (with a conse-
quent blow to market reputation and a resultant
diminution in the freight rates a vessel can command);
secondly, the risk of investing in the wrong type of scrub-
bers; and thirdly, the associated risk that operators on
scrubber vessels may need to ‘cover’ themselves against
regulatory uncertainty by making dual provision—invest-
ing in scrubbers but also carrying a strategic reserve of
compliant low-sulphur fuel as well as the residual fuel oil
for scrubbing. The latter risk adds considerably to overall
installation costs through extra piping, storage and settle-
ment tanks, consequent loss of payload space, and
increasing overall fuel costs:
. . .where you solely rely on the scrubber to meet your envir-
onmental objectives and do not carry the supplies of compliant
fuel instead [. . .] it is very important, especially in the cruise
industry where we may visit 27 or 30 different ports in a
season, to know that we can use that scrubber in every port
that the ship visits [. . .]. Without that absolute regulatory cer-
tainty that that scrubber can be used in every port in the area
in which the ship is operating, it becomes a much more difﬁcult
investment decision to make. (oral evidence: Robert Ashdown,
European Cruise Council)
4.3 The wrong scrubbers
As already implied, a range of scrubber systems is avail-
able: dry scrubbers (using calcium hydroxide granulate
and producing calcium sulphate waste, used in gypsum
industries), wet scrubbers on an open loop (i.e. with
wash-water discharge), wet scrubbers on a closed loop (po-
tentially suitable for ferries on short voyages), and hybrids
like that used for the Tor Ficaria. A range of different
scrubbers are also ﬁtted to different power plants.
Although the ﬁrst scrubbers were ﬁtted to power plants
back in the 1930s, no one-size-ﬁts-all technical ﬁx has
emerged. Rather, different fuels and different sized plants
require different cost-efﬁcient scrubber designs (Kaminski
2003). The choice of maritime scrubber has implications
for the vessel’s future trading patterns:
. . .we have got rather lax [. . .] in our approach to marine op-
erations in the sense that one size goes everywhere. But [. . .] we
are going to have to start thinking as to what option do I
adopt? Do I adopt an option that has a high capital or a
high operating cost? (marine fuel expert)
Critics and advocates of marine scrubbers alike agree that
it is a developing technology. The industry includes
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companies such as Aalborg Industries, with 40 years ex-
perience of systems for dealing with inert gases venting
from oil tankers, and Wartsila, the marine engine and
power plant manufacturer with previous experience of
manufacturing power station scrubbers. A Singaporean
company, Ecospec, is even (very controversially) claiming
to have developed a scrubbing system that will scrub CO2
as well as SOx and NOx (Lloyds List 2011). It is possible
that future developments could deliver quicker investment
paybacks and could be cheaper in terms of capital and/or
operating costs than the present generation of scrubbers.
There is therefore an argument that can be made for
delayed investment:
. . . gigantic amounts of investments to be made [in vessels] that
have to work for 20-to-30 years, that’s the perspective, and
they don’t want to lock themselves into a technology that
will be out-of-date the day after tomorrow. (shipping associ-
ation representative)
It has also been suggested that wet scrubbers, as a technol-
ogy, are effective in meeting the current 1% sulphur limit
in the ECAs but may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to meet future require-
ments to operate with 0.5% or 0.1% sulphur:
Some scrubbers use sea water to wash the fumes and the water
ﬂow that is needed [. . .] down to 1% [sulphur] is no problem,
but then at 0.5% or 0.1% it takes so much water that it is
nearly impossible to achieve a functioning system on board.
(marine fuel expert)
Wet scrubbers may be relatively inefﬁcient in Baltic waters
because of the lower alkalinity of Baltic Sea water. And
vessels with dry scrubbers will need regular port access to
substantial amounts of calcium hydroxide granulate and
port facilities to dispose of the spent granulate.
4.4 Lack of investment funds
The written evidence to the committee supplied by the
cruise company, Carnival UK, suggested that the installa-
tion costs of a scrubber on a large cruise ship would be
US$13–20 million, with annual running costs in the region
of US$150,000–900,000, depending on the type of
scrubber. The cost of the scrubber retroﬁtted onto the
(single engine) Tor Ficaria ferry was US$2.9 million, with
an additional US$3 million installation costs (if it had been
a new build it would have been US$1.5 million) and with
estimated annual running costs of US$181,440 (Knudsen
2010). Payback times on this investment may be short or
longer: the estimated payback time for the Tor Ficaria was
1.35 years (Knudsen 2010), but the written evidence from
Stena Line suggested a much longer period. But, in any
case, US$13 million for a cruise ship installation or US$6
million for a ferry installation is still a lot of money to ﬁnd
upfront. Some of the larger scrubber manufacturers
have been prepared to part-fund trial installations
(the Tor Ficaria and Pride of Kent installations were
both part-funded in this way), but clearly this is not
going to be an important source of future funding for
ship owners.
Investments (in new builds or in new installations) may
be ﬁnanced by bank loans, ship mortgages or from proﬁts.
The cyclical nature of the industry has already been
described above—proﬁtability has fallen in most sectors
of shipping since 2008. And the ‘credit crunch’ has
reduced bank lending and mortgage activity, particularly
where operational and maintenance costs are uncertain.
Thus:
These [scrubbers] are essentially prototype technologies. There
are very few of them operating in the world, very few operating
on main engines and even fewer operating as part of a com-
pliance regime. The level of experience is low and, of course,
these may have high operating costs. To try and take that
business model to a bank or lender and say, ‘We want you
to lend for a product which is unproven and which may or may
not work’, poses signiﬁcant difﬁculties for companies. (oral
evidence: Robert Ashdown, European Cruise Council)
And similarly:
. . . I think because it is a huge capital investment not many
ship owners have the money to do these kind of things right
now. And then there has been the regulatory uncertainty that
has just made it easier to kind of close our eyes and say let’s
just postpone the whole thing. (shipping company manager)
Note that the above interviewee is positing an additive
relationship between the different non-technical arguments
against scrubber investment, but interactive relationships
may also be occurring, as where lack of ﬁrst-mover advan-
tage is exacerbated by current regulatory uncertainty,
which will naturally diminish over time.
The shipping industry is not alone reducing investment
levels: business investment has fallen substantially in most
industrial sectors across the globe since 2008. This is some-
times described as an ‘investment strike’ (Burke 2012), not
a wholly accurate term when businesses ﬁnd themselves
both under pressure from banks to reduce their
borrowings and with surplus capacity due to falling
demand. Several of the submissions to the committee
from ship operators requested government funding to
defray the costs of scrubber investment, but the commit-
tee’s report did not support this and neither did the UK
government’s response to the report.2
4.5 Short-termism
Closely related to a lack of investment funds is managerial
short-termism, deﬁned by the Financial Times lexicon
(2012) as:
. . . an excessive focus on short-term results at the expense of
long-term interests.
Corporate leaders are said to be driven by accountancy-
driven metrics like earnings per share (EPS) to restrict
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spending on research and development; companies which
have large development budgets but low EPS are very vul-
nerable to take-over bids. Only privately-owned companies
are immune to these pressures. The need to control cor-
porate expenditures in order to maintain EPS leads to the
concentration of investment decision-making in the hands
of a few senior persons who may not always be fully
informed on technical aspects of the investment, a situ-
ation that is exacerbated where shipping forms only part
of a transnational corporation’s activities. Thus:
I think the industry has changed quite a bit in the way it
operates and who holds the purse strings and who are the
decision-makers. [. . .] most of that discretionary expenditure
or decisions all sits with the chief executive [. . .]. So getting it to
board level, and I think this is where it needs to be, and getting
the board to understand that this is a strategic decision, that if
they don’t get it correct could be they’ll go out of business, is
the challenge. (expert on scrubbers)
4.6 Future availability of residual fuel
As mentioned previously, high-sulphur fuel oil is by-
product of reﬁnery distillation processes: supply is thus
unresponsive to demand. Moreover, improvements in
reﬁnery technology are gradually reducing the proportion
of residual fuel that is being produced. Industry experts
predict that a future generation of reﬁneries will no
longer produce residual fuel:
. . . if you develop the sort-of sophistication of a reﬁnery [. . .]
you end up with mostly higher fractions, no residual fuel oil,
and just petroleum coke at the bottom which [. . .] has no sort
of hydro carbon value. (bunker industry expert)
This diminution in supply will be very gradual because
reﬁnery plant has a long operating life. But vessels also
have a long operating life (say 20/25 years), so that the
future availability of residual oil for scrubbers is an add-
itional source of uncertainty for investors in new-build
vessels.
There is also an additional question mark over future
fuel availability that relates, not to the reﬁneries, but to the
bunker suppliers. Namely, that if very few ship owners opt
to retroﬁt scrubbers onto their vessels by 2015, then
bunker suppliers may no longer consider that it is econom-
ically viable to store and supply high-sulphur fuel oil.
Early investors in scrubber installations may then ﬁnd
that they cannot source high-sulphur fuel for their new
scrubbers—a wasted investment. Thus:
The danger is that, certainly within the Baltic Sea in 2015, if
the market penetration of scrubbers remains very low, then the
ships will be using distillate fuels to remain in compliance. If all
the ships are using distillate fuels, that means the bunker
supply industry may no longer supply residual fuel oils into
the Baltic Sea area. So [. . .] there will not be the higher sulphur
residual fuel to purchase to scrub down [. . .] which is the ra-
tionale for the business case. (oral evidence: Robert Ashdown,
European Cruise council)
4.7 Industry structure
Finally, the vertical disaggregation of the industry may be
thought to militate against investment in scrubbers. For
many vessels, the owner is not the operator: specialist
ship management companies contract with an owner to
manage a vessel or a ﬂeet of vessels. And the operator
does not always pay for the fuel: that responsibility may
lie with the charterer. Charterers may, in turn, re-let a
vessel to another charterer, who then may be liable for
the fuel costs. Thus, the vessel owner who is taking the
decision on whether or not to invest in scrubber installa-
tions often experiences no direct beneﬁts from the char-
terer’s lower fuel costs, only the possibility that such an
installation may make the vessel more attractive to char-
terers. This may be thought to dilute the investment incen-
tive for owners. The same point was made in relation to
ship owners’ investment in carbon abatement technologies
in a recent House of Commons Committee Report on
climate change policies (House of Commons Climate
Change Committee 2008). The opportunities for scrubber
sales may therefore be largely conﬁned to that fraction of
the industry where owner-operators predominate (in the
ferry and cruise sectors) and to blue riband owner-oper-
ators elsewhere such as Maersk Line (container sector) and
BP Shipping (tankers).
5. Conclusions
In describing scientiﬁc and technological disputes, STS re-
searchers have described the notion of rhetorical ‘closure’.
Thus, writing of the contest between environmentalists and
road transport interests over the plan for a Trans-Israel
Highway, Garb describes the moment when:
. . . the winning project (or theory) comes to occupy the full
space of possibility, alternatives become unthinkable, and all
‘serious’ argument is now conducted inside the project’s ‘box’.
(Garb 2005)
At the time of writing this paper, the point of closure has
not been reached in the contest over scrubbing technology,
but arguably it is looming. In 2015 all ships in the ECAs
will be required to burn 0.1% sulphur fuel. A dry-dock
manager interviewed in November 2011 did not know of
any competitor dockyard in Europe that might have an
order for retroﬁtting scrubbers. Thirty million euros of
Finnish state aid for retroﬁtting scrubbers, approved in
January 2013, has created a recent mini-boom for
Finnish scrubber manufacturer, Wartsila, with orders for
27 vessels by March 2013. But elsewhere and to date, the
Canadian Algoma Central Corporation remains the only
shipping company that has placed a multi-vessel order for
new-build scrubber installations. As one interviewee put it,
nearly all the shipping companies are still ‘dancing round
their handbags’. Unless decisions on investments in scrub-
bers are made almost immediately, ship operators will have
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no choice but to switch to 0.1% sulphur fuel (distillate) in
the ECAs from 2015. It is perhaps signiﬁcant that the same
dry-dock manager reported a boom in the retroﬁtting of
‘split’ service tanks, especially in the last couple of years:
splitting a ship’s service tank (a relatively cheap and
straightforward procedure) enables the vessel to readily
and economically switch between distillate and high-
sulphur fuel when moving in and out of the ECAs.
Additionally, as has already been stated, if only a very
few vessels in the ECAs operate with scrubbers, then this
may well cause at least some of the bunker suppliers in the
ECAs to stop supplying high-sulphur fuel, prejudicing
future scrubber operations.
To be clear, our argument here is not that shipping
companies’ technical claims about the lack of maturity of
scrubber technologies are false. In pointing to the extreme
environmental conditions in which ships operate and the
serious consequences of even infrequent equipment
failures, it could be said that shipping companies are
drawing on the same valid ‘local knowledge’ that
Cumbrian sheep farmers drew on to contest scientiﬁc
advice on the radioactive contamination of sheep
pastures Wynne 1992), and that the farmworkers union
drew on to contest the ‘decontextualized’ advice of the
UK Advisory Committee on Pesticides on the safety of
the pesticide 2,4,5-T (Irwin 1995). Instead, our argument
is that these technical claims are specious: they are analo-
gous to what Habermas called the ‘scientization of politics’
(Habermas 1970). The manufacturers wish to sell their
scrubbers and the shipping companies wish to delay their
investment decisions, but these conﬂicting commercial
interests are represented, or misrepresented, as a contest
between different technical claims.
Similarly, there should be no disputing the right of en-
terprises and industry associations to lobby governments
and in the course of that lobbying technical arguments
may play a legitimate part. This is an old song. A
celebrated earlier example was the strong opposition of
US car manufacturers to the 1970 Clean Air Act and
their associated scepticism that catalytic converter technol-
ogy, if installed in their vehicles, could achieve the stand-
ards set by the act. In a memo sent to Congress by the
Automobile Manufacturers Association it was stated that:
. . . it will simply not be possible for vehicle manufacturers to
achieve the control levels speciﬁed in the bill. (Automobile
Manufacturers Association 1970)
The projected health beneﬁts of pollution controls were
also disputed (Kovarik and Hermes n.d.). In the event,
the new catalytic converters introduced in 1975 proved
equal to the task.
Just as in the depiction of the interpretive ﬂexibility that
occurred in respect of the superiority of different bicycle
technologies (Pinch et al. (1984), there are different social
and economic interests inﬂuencing the different claims
concerning the technical effectiveness and efﬁciency of
scrubbers. There is also a political dimension that lies in-
dissolubly behind these different technical claims, in this
case it is the dimension of environmental politics, where
ship operators have identiﬁed a need to present themselves
as environmentally responsible to charterers, shareholders,
legislators and passengers (Bloor et al. 2013). The ﬁtting of
scrubbers would allow vessels to reduce sulphur emissions
both inside and outside the ECAs, which would produce
clear and immediate environmental beneﬁts. However, the
cost implications of such measures deter ship operators
from investing in such equipment. An image of ship oper-
ators as more concerned with ﬁnance than with the envir-
onment would be unfortunate and damaging, so the
operators’ sincerely held technical reservations are placed
in the foreground rather than their funding concerns. A
potentially harmful dispute about environmental damage
is defused and converted into a symbolic (in anthropolo-
gical terms) technical argument.
There are many examples, within the history of science
and technology, of scientiﬁc or technical disputes acting as
epiphenomena for other struggles, be they economic or
personal. To give one instance, in the 1930s J. S.
Haldane (Oxford professor of physiology and honorary
director of the Mining Research Laboratory) strongly con-
tested claims about the pathogenic qualities of coal dust
and thus delayed the recognition of pneumoconiosis as a
compensatable industrial disease. Haldane had earlier
identiﬁed the presence of silicosis among Cornish tin
miners cutting their way through silica-rich rock. Despite
accumulating epidemiological and X-ray evidence to the
contrary, Haldane long claimed that the widespread pul-
monary disease among coal miners was not due to the high
levels of coal dust produced by mechanical cutters and
conveyors, but was either due to the presence of silica in
some pits or due to bronchitis. Meiklejohn (1952), in his
history of pneumoconiosis states that:
There can be little dispute that, in relation to bronchitis,
Haldane’s intransigence beguiled him.
Haldane persisted in advancing specious scientiﬁc argu-
ments in order to defend his personal prestige.
In writing of the struggles 80 years ago of the leaders of
the South Wales miners to obtain compensation for miners
suffering with pulmonary disease, Bloor (2000) has
described how union ofﬁcials instrumentally used scientiﬁc
expertise in a variety of forms—they contributed epi-
demiological evidence, lobbied for government research
funding, ‘bought’ experts, duped expert witnesses, and
made sophisticated instrumental appeals to the supposed
independence of favourable expert opinion. The present
paper, in contrast, is about the instrumental use of technical
doubt. Scientiﬁc or technical statements, be they about
scrubbers or about global warming, are always both uni-
versal and provisional, potentially open to re-examination
and subsequent qualiﬁcation. Closure is a matter of taken-
for-granted communal understanding, rather than simply
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a matter of technical demonstration. Scientiﬁc/technical
reasons for action or inaction are not simply shared (i.e.
socially acceptable) ‘vocabularies of motive’ (Mills 1940),
they are also a means of prolonging debate: further
evidence may be called for, universal applicability and
long-term durability may be questioned, and future suit-
ability in changed circumstances may be uncertain. Studies
of ‘market failures’ in implementing environmental or sus-
tainable innovation (Foxon and Pearson 2008) may need
to embrace the role of instrumental technical doubt in pre-
venting the movement of early-stage technologies along
the innovation chain.
The precautionary principle, a cornerstone of UN and
EU environmental policy, states that the lack of full scien-
tiﬁc certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degrad-
ation (UN 1992; Commission of the European
Communities 2000). However, as with tobacco companies
funding sceptics about the harmful effects of tobacco, and
energy companies funding climate change sceptics (Orestes
and Conway 2010), the debate over the installation of
scrubbers shows how technical doubt may be used instru-
mentally to justify delay in the implementation of social or
economic change.
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Notes
1. Technically, it is possible for some types of scrubber
to be retroﬁtted on some types of vessel without
dry-docking, by a ‘riding crew’. However, we under-
stand that the numbers of suitably qualiﬁed riding
crews likely to be available for such work are quite
limited.
2. Pleas for government assistance in making new
technologies cost-effective do not always fall on deaf
ears. This has long been advocated as a principle in the
development of clean technologies (Foxon and
Pearson 2008) and in January 2013 the European
Commission approved a Finnish state scheme to
provide E30 million to assist in the retroﬁtting of
scrubbers (Finnish Ministry of Transport and
Communications 2013).
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